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Abstract:
Nanotechnologies are expected to be the dominant general purpose technology of the next 
decades. Their market potential is immense and especially demand side arguments will have 
far reaching consequences for innovations. They may occur as increased miniaturization or 
via building completely new products, processes or services. Innovations in the field of 
nanotechnologies do not only affect productivity in downstream sectors but these feed back to 
nanotechnologies thereby inducing circles of continuing innovation. Demand for nano-
components mainly arises by firms while private demand is assigned to final products, 
processes or services that are augmented by nanotechnologies. Due to the technology’s 
controversial character, the consumer’s attitude towards risk and technology affects private 
demand and this may either spur or hamper innovation. The paper aims to unravel how these 
complex interdependencies and feedback mechanisms affect overall innovation that is 
induced by nanotechnologies and how this on its part affects further improvements of 
nanotechnologies.
JEL-codes: O33, Z13 
Keywords: general purpose technologies, controversial technologies, determinants of 
innovation.
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1 Introduction  
Future decades are expected to be largely dominated by increased utilization and spread of 
nanotechnologies. This term broadly refers to technologies and devices whose unifying theme 
is the control of matter at an atomic and molecular scale, namely with critical dimensions 
smaller than 100 nanometers. Basically there are two main approaches used in 
nanotechnologies. Most important until nowadays is the top-down approach according to 
which nano-objects are constructed from larger level entities with the goal of ongoing 
miniaturization. Besides there exists the bottom-up approach in which materials and devices 
are built from molecular components which assemble themselves chemically. The 
manipulation of nanostructures leads to the observation of completely new phenomena.   
For countries that are poorly endowed with natural resources there is no alternative to 
permanent innovation for being competitive at an international level. Especially important to 
achieve this goal are human capital and knowledge that both provide the basis for ongoing 
technological progress. Within endogenous growth theory there is a sophisticated debate on 
the origins of technological progress and its implications for ongoing growth (see e.g. 
Barro/Sala-i-Martin (2004) for a recent overview over the corresponding theories). A more 
precise look at innovation determinants reveals that it is possible for most eras to identify a 
certain technology that has a key function for the generation of innovations in other fields (see 
e.g. Rosenberg (1992)). This led to the distinction in drastic and incremental innovations, the 
former introducing far-reaching effects not only at the level of the economy but also for entire 
societies. Drastic innovations frequently spur incremental innovations in complementary 
fields. If drastic innovations have the potential for pervasive utilization – as e.g. the steam 
engine, electricity or the computer – they are called general purpose technologies (see e.g. 
Bresnahan/Trajtenberg (1995) who coined that term).  
Several features qualify nanotechnologies as future dominating general purpose technology.
One is pervasiveness since the technology may be utilized in lots of animate and inanimate 
fields. Due to their tininess they are used at the origins of the value creation chain and induce 
high technological dynamics. Improvements of nanotechnologies also affect productivity in 
the downstream sectors which, at consequence of technological dynamics, spurs innovation of 
the upstream technology. As consequence, not only production but also innovation processes 
are vertically linked at which the latter interdependency runs in both directions along the 
value creation chain. Above, nanotechnologies are frequently entitled controversial 
technologies thereby stating that it is not per se clear whether chances or possible risks 3
dominate. Hence, individual attitudes towards technologies and risk become important for the 
development of nanotechnology. In extreme, failing public acceptance may interrupt further 
developments. Usually, innovation processes are driven by demand side as well as by supply 
side arguments. Due to the multitude of interdependencies along the value creation chain 
demand for general purpose technologies may be driven by various actors: firms, consumers 
and additionally the government each of them following different motives and thereby 
impacting very differently on the innovation process.  
This paper aims to unravel how the complex interdependencies affect overall innovations that 
are induced by nanotechnologies and how this feeds back to the original technology. We 
thereby focus primarily on aspects arising from firm’s demand for nano-components and 
private demand for final products that are augmented by nanotechnologies. The reminder of 
the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents determinants and economic aspects of general 
purpose technologies. Section 3 analyzes supply side and demand side arguments of 
innovation in the case of controversial technologies. Section 4 applies the arguments detailed 
before on the case of nanotechnologies. Section 5 briefly concludes. 
2 Economic Aspects of General Purpose Technologies 
2.1 Drastic versus Incremental Innovations 
In the simplest form, technological progress arises as incremental process that improves the 
efficiency of resource deployment. It may not be uniform across sectors or time, but the 
aggregate effects are relatively smooth.
1 In contrast are major inventions that had far-reaching 
and prolonged implications, such as the steam engine, electricity, or the computer. The 
distinction between drastic and incremental innovation is useful since frequently incremental 
innovations – although taking place in the regular course of business - follow drastic 
innovations. A drastic innovation, however, introduces a discontinuity in the organization of 
the economy in the sense that the innovation replaces an old technology that played a 
significant role in an industry with new methods of production. Or it replaces an old material 
that performed certain functions with a new one.
2
Note that a discontinuity in this sense does not automatically imply a necessary discontinuity 
in the observed pattern of resource allocation or the evolution of output. The introduction of a 
1 The incremental nature of technological process has been well documented by economic historians (see e.g. 
Rosenberg (1992)). 
2 Examples for an exchange of technology could be the replacement of horse power by electricity or in case of 
products the replacement of rubber or steel by plastics.  4
superior technology can be gradual, starting with a negligible absorption of resources which is 
followed by continuous expansion over time.
3 It is nevertheless helpful to distinguish between 
drastic and incremental innovations since the latter frequently are triggered by drastic 
innovations. Put differently, drastic innovations induce series of incremental (and often 
complementary) innovations.  
The distinction between drastic and incremental innovations is also helpful with respect to 
their emergence: It is possible that forces driving incremental innovations are different from 
those that drive drastic innovations. For example, incremental innovations are more 
susceptible to standard profitability calculations, even when they involve externalities and are 
subject to risk, simply because markets can evaluate their profitability. In contrast, drastic 
innovations face much larger uncertainties, producing risks that are much harder to evaluate 
by the market (see e.g. Rosenberg (1996)). As a result drastic innovators can engage little in 
risk-sharing and have to bear most of the risk themselves.
4
2.2 Peculiarities of General Purpose Technologies 
A drastic innovation qualifies as general purpose technology if it has the potential for 
pervasive use in a wide range of sectors in ways that drastically change their modes of 
operation. To quote from Bresnahan/Trajtenberg (1995), who coined the term general purpose 
technology and provided a highly original discussion of its usefulness,
5
Most GPTs play the role of “enabling technologies,” opening up new opportunities 
rather than offering complete, final solutions. For example, the productivity gains 
associated with the introduction of electric motors in manufacturing were not limited 
to a reduction in energy costs. The new energy sources fostered the more efficient 
design of factories, taking advantage of the newfound flexibility of electric power. 
Similarly, the users of microelectronics benefit from the surging power of silicon by 
wrapping around the integrated circuits their own technical advantages. This 
phenomenon involves what we call “innovational complementarities” (IC), that is, the 
productivity of R&D in a downstream sector increases as a consequence of innovation 
in the GPT. These complementarities magnify the effects of innovation in the GPT, 
and help propagate them throughout the economy. 
3 However it is not trivial to identify possible discontinuities in the empirical data. A recent discussion about the 
state of the art and possibly arising problems can be found e.g. in Christiansen (2008).  
4 Hence governmental demand is most important to spur innovation in the field of drastic innovations while 
private demand may well suffice for incremental innovations. However, this paper neglects from a sophisticated 
discussion of the role of governmental demand. 
5 In the following parts the abbreviation GPT stands for general purpose technology. 5
The description makes clear two most important features of drastic innovations that qualify as 
general purpose technologies: generality of purpose as well as innovational 
complementarities.
6 When these effects are particularly strong, as for example in the case of 
electricity, information and communication technologies and the internet or henceforth 
nanotechnologies, they lead to considerable changes in economic organizations. Sometimes 
they also affect the organization of society through changes in working hours, constraints of 
family life, social stratification, and the like.
7
Figure 1: Generality of purpose and innovational complementarities (GPT: general purpose 
technology; AS: applying sector) 
6 Note that other authors, like e.g. Lispey et al. (1998) define general purpose technologies slightly different. For 
example these authors stress the importance that at their emergence general purpose technologies are 
characterized by wide potential of improvement hence inducing technological dynamics.  
7 The emergence of electricity, e.g., made people independent from daylight. This had far reaching consequences 
for the organization of work life – and hence also affected the daily routines not only of firms but also of 
families.  6
One immediate consequence of pervasiveness are strong interdependencies between lots of 
actors along the value creation chain. Figure 1 contains a technology tree that illustrates 
horizontal and vertical linkages that arise between the general purpose technology (denoted 
by GPT) and downstream sectors (applying sectors, hence AS) which apply the technology. 
The generality of purpose is indicated by the vertical linkages while horizontal lines between 
the applying sectors illustrate that also firms at the same level of the value creation chain are 
basically interrelated. Figure 1 also contains two innovation processes (from the pure idea 
until diffusion) which are indicated by the outside arrows. One innovation process begins at 
the level of the general purpose technology and works downwards the value creation chain. 
Diffusion then takes places via utilization of the general purpose technology in downstream 
sectors in which the technology plays the role of an intermediate input, and diffusion along 
the technology tree takes place in the form of a cascade. Additionally, Figure 1 encompasses a 
second innovation process, which in turn, comes from the applying sector and goes back to 
the general purpose technology and hence runs upwards the value creation chain. This 
indicates that inherent to the general purpose technology there is potential of technological 
improvement that runs in two directions.
8 The utilization of the general purpose technology 
by the downstream firms reveals potential for improvement and hence induces innovation 
processes in the upstream sector, namely the general purpose technology. This, in turn, 
induces improvements in the upstream general purpose technology which again feed back to 
downstream sectors and so forth.
As argued in the context of Figure 1, lots of interactions between up-stream and downstream 
sectors exist. These interdependencies do not only arise in a production context but also 
during the innovation processes within companies. They incorporate two fundamental 
externalities:
9
• Vertical externalities: Due to innovational complementarities, the innovation activities in 
upstream and downstream industries are related, and firms in upstream and downstream 
sectors have linked payoffs. As long as each firm decides individually it does not consider the 
aggregate effects arising from its individual action. Consequently, the well-known 
appropriability effect (namely the failing to appropriate the entire returns of individual 
activities) arises (see Helpman/Trajtenberg (1998)). A familiar problem of imperfect access to 
the social returns arises, except that in the context of general purpose technologies it runs in 
both ways. This encompasses a bilateral moral hazard problem which implies that not any 
8 Bresnahan/Trajtenberg (1995) call this ‘dual inducement hypothesis’. 
9 See Bresnahan/Trajtenberg (1995) for a formal presentation of these interdependencies.  7
side, neither the upstream nor the downstream firm, will have sufficient incentives to 
innovate. As consequence, the innovation incentives along the entire value creation chain are 
too little with respect to the extent and arise too late. 
• Horizontal externalities: Applying sectors include actual and possible users of the general 
purpose technology. Their demand depends positively upon the quality and negatively upon 
the price of the general purpose technology. At the same time, quality within the general 
purpose technology sector depends on marginal production costs and on the (aggregate) 
technological level of all applying sectors. Hence, if one single applying sector innovates to 
increase its own technological level (with the goal to reduce own production costs) also the 
aggregate level of all applying sectors will increase. This leads to improvements within the 
general purpose technology and hence to reduced costs not only in the originally innovating 
sector but also in the other (non-innovating) downstream sectors. However, as argued before, 
again the appropriability effect comes in action and again this induces a moral hazard 
problem: Why should any applying sector innovate if it could benefit at zero costs from the 
innovation in another sector? 
To sum up: As Bresnahan/Trajtenberg (1995) noted, general purpose technologies introduce 
two types of externalities: one between the general purpose technology and the application 
sectors; another across the application sectors. The former stems from the difficulties that an 
inventor of the general purpose technology may have in appropriating the fruits of the 
invention. When institutional conditions prevent full appropriation, the general purpose 
technology is effectively underpriced and therefore undersupplied. The latter occurs since the 
application sectors are not coordinated and each one conditions its expansion of the available 
general purpose technology. If in contrast they coordinated a joint expansion, they would raise 
the profitability of the general purpose technology and encourage its improvement. A better 
general purpose technology fits them all. Consequently, coordination of a joint expansion – 
and with this the conditions of demand – are of major importance for the diffusion and thus 
improvement of the general purpose technology which in the end benefits all.
2.3 General Purpose Technologies and their Implications for Aggregate Growth 
From an economic point of view, general purpose technologies are not only interesting from a 
microeconomic perspective but they have also some peculiarities with respect to their 
aggregate effect or, to be more precise, for aggregate growth. As has been widely shown by 
economic historians, in any given period, there exist some technologies that play a far-
reaching role in the sense that they bring about sustained and pervasive productivity gains and 8
which, in consequence, widely foster economic growth.
10 Some examples are the steam 
engine during the industrial revolution, electricity during the first decades, or microelectronics 
in the second half of the 20
th century. Nanotechnologies are expected to induce the next long 
run wave. The basic argumentation is as follows: As an improved version of the general 
purpose technology becomes available it gets adopted by an increasing number of application 
sectors which, in turn, are accompanied by further advances thus raising the attractiveness of 
further adoption. This increases the demand for the general purpose technology, thereby 
inducing improvements of the general purpose technology, which then prompts a new round 
of advances in the application sectors, and so forth. As the effects become significant at an 
aggregate level, the general purpose technology finally affects overall growth. However, even 
if substantially important in the long run, new technologies may first have no significant 
impact on actual growth, since they have to await for the development of a sufficiently large 
amount of complementary assets in the applying sector. Moreover, these assets use up 
resources and hence, in the short nun, growth may even be negatively affected.  
Helpman/Trajtenberg (1998) develop a growth model which allows studying the economy-
wide dynamics that the emergence of a new general purpose technology may generate. We 
just present a short sketch of the model’s simplest version without going into formal details 
thereby assuming that advances in the general purpose technology are exogenous. Hence we 
abstract from analyzing the implications of innovational complementarities discussed before. 
To keep the discussion simple we focus on the role of complementarity in the sense that the 
downstream sectors, which provide components that are complementary to the general 
purpose technology, and their incentives for innovation are of primary interest.
11 Figure 2 
provides a simple illustration of the relevant interdependencies.  
10 Note especially the literature in the context of so called basic innovations which induce long run waves which 
sometimes are also called Kondratieff cycles; observe also the argumentation in Rosenberg (1996).  
11 Observe that one could basically extend the analysis also with respect to the role of complementary investment 
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Figure 2: The importance of complements (ǻ: phase in which a general purpose 
technology is available; ǻ1: phase with productivity decline; ǻ2 phase with 
productivity growth; Ȝ
i: general purpose technology at work; FPS: final product sector; 
R&D: research and development)
It contains a stylized sequence of the emergence of a new general purpose technology which 
contains three cycles. Each cycle is denoted by ǻ and describes a phase in which a certain 
general purpose technology, denoted by Ȝ
i, is at work. The parameter i is ordinal and indicates 
the current general purpose technology. Since the general purpose technology is not a lonely 
standing technology but is applied to a variety of uses we distinguish the utilization within the 
final product sector (denoted by FPS) and in the component sector (denoted by R&D). Each 
cycle is divided in two phases, ǻ1 and ǻ2, and which may be distinguished as follows: Within 
the first phase, ǻ1, final output is manufactured with the old general purpose technology, Ȝ
i,
while innovators already develop components for the new general purpose technology, Ȝ
i+1.
Consequently, the number of components for Ȝ
i+1 rises over time. Note that the development 
of components for the next technology comes at the cost of negative output and productivity 
growth, stagnating real wages, and declining profit shares. In the second phase, ǻ2, after a 
sufficient amount of components for the new general purpose technology has been developed, 
manufacturers of final output switch to the new technology, Ȝ
i+1, while innovators still 10
continue to develop components for this technology. Then the benefits of an advanced general 
purpose technology manifest themselves. As consequence, output, real wages, and profits rise.
In Figure 2 this becomes apparent while looking at the general purpose technology at work 
within the separate sectors, namely the sectors for final good production and the one for the 
development of components: While during ǻ1 two different general purpose technologies (e.g. 
Ȝ
1 and Ȝ
2) affect economic activity in the respective sector, ǻ2 is characterized by the overall 
utilization of the most recent general purpose technology (e.g. Ȝ
2) in both the component and 
the final product sector.
To sum up: Within each cycle, ǻ1, the analysis shows the centrality that complementary 
investments play in the aggregate growth process. Above it is shown how the sequential and 
cumulative nature of such complementary investments may induce different phases along 
each cycle, each of them exhibiting very different features. Of special interest is the initial 
phase of negative or below average growth. This results from the fact that there exists a 
threshold level of complementary inputs that needs to be developed before the general 
purpose technology at work in final good’s production can be displaced by the newest one. 
Hence one has to carefully consider the time line in assessing the growth impact of general 
purpose technologies.
3 Innovation and International Competitiveness 
3.1 Supply and Demand Side Arguments 
Until here the argumentation referred to the interdependencies between up- and downstream 
sectors, the arising coordination problem that ends up in too little and too late innovation, and 
delayed growth effects induced by the general purpose technology. This perspective already 
underlines the fundamental point of the development of general purpose technologies, namely 
the role of demand. As we argue along the technology tree, not only demand for final 
products but also firms’ demands that arise along the value creation chain gains importance.  
Those theories that focus on the supply side frequently stress the implications of knowledge as 
(at least partial) public good. Innovative firms are not able to appropriate all returns that are 
generated by their innovation activities while they have to cover the entire costs. 
Consequently the incentive for innovation is sub-optimally low and the innovation process is 
accompanied by market failures. This justifies governmental intervention in the innovation 11
process frequently in the form of direct or indirect subsidies.
12 In addition, supply of new 
products, processes or services is also affected by national tax systems, the availability of 
qualified labor or other input factors as well as by cooperation possibilities with component 
suppliers or other firms.  
A relevant impact for continuous innovation stems from ambitious customers, the market 
structure as well as from economies of scale and scope in production. Picking up this 
argument, other approaches emphasize the role of the demand side for the generation of 
knowledge, innovation and international competitiveness (see e.g. Linder (1961), Blümle 
(1994) or Fagerberg (1995)). These approaches do not focus on the pure technological aspects 
but lay an emphasis on the needs and the utility of the users. Summarizing these arguments, 
Beise/Cleff (2004) or Gerybadze et al. (1997) focus on so called lead markets that enable 
promising technologies to emerge. Lead markets arise if a critical amount of users, whose 
needs determine the quality of demand, exist. Lead users (in contrast to ‘normal users’) may 
be characterized as follows: (i) they are precursors of a broad commercial market and hence 
early anticipators of global trends, (ii) they expect high utility from new products, processes 
or services, (iii) they claim for the implantation of ideas and inventions in final products, 
processes and services, and (iv) fall back on local resources. Aside from private individuals or 
firms, also governments may become lead users, e.g. by buying special products or services or 
by issuing research orders for them. Typically, the government is especially important in the 
field of cutting edge technologies, such as information and communication technology, 
aerospace industry or military technology. 
3.2 Lead Markets and Competitiveness of Local Firms 
The existence of a domestic lead market and hence high demand with respect to quantity but 
also to quality allows supplying firms first to meet local demand, then to activate exports and 
eventually to provide products, processes and services to a broad range of users and at 
international markets.
13 Due to the market proximity local firms will be the first to notice the 
demand of new lead users. In detail the advantages can be grouped into: 
12 This topic is discussed in detail within the literature on industrial organization. An overview can be found e.g. 
in Tirole (1990). The corresponding impact on aggregate growth is discussed e.g. by Aghion/Howitt (1998), 
Grossman/Helpman (1990) or Barro/Sala-i-Martin (2004).  
13 Some typical examples for lead markets are US for personal computers or drugs, Japan for fax and video or 
Scandinavian countries for mobile telephones. Germany is a typical lead market in automobile or process 
technology. The latter includes mechanical engineering, measurement technology, environmental technology and 
technical components. The lead position is based on a strong industrial basis as well as mostly on the preferences 
of industrial customers.   12
 Cost advantages: Research and technology intensive industries are frequently 
characterized by economies of scale and scope. Hence, to benefit from the corresponding 
scale and scope effects in form of cost degression, not only the current volume of 
domestic demand but also the corresponding dynamics (the growth of demand) are 
important to assure international competitiveness. The positive scale effects are then 
magnified by the market volume.  
 Export advantages: This summarizes effects like representativity of domestic preferences 
for the world market, sensibility compared to changes of the demand conditions at the 
world market, the export ratio, but also linguistic and social compatibility with the advised 
market. Hence export advantages may arise if consumers at the home market prefer 
products and processes that have the potential to be successful also at other markets (see 
e.g. Beise (2001)).
Firms in lead markets are the first to benefit from these advantages and this continuously 
secures a competitive advantage for innovative domestic firms (see e.g. Morrison et al. 
(2004))
3.3 On the Role of Private Demand for Controversial Technologies 
Inherent in innovative products and services is uncertainty. Therefore, individual risk attitude 
and risk perception become crucial for the actually existing private demand. The individual 
attitude towards technology and science also affect the preferences of domestic consumers. 
Individual openness towards new technologies is significantly affected by both anticipated 
utility and perceived risks. Slovic (1999) emphasizes that most notably the risk potential, its 
possible way to control it, the familiarity with risks and the public recognition determines how 
private individuals perceive innovations and hence drives demand for new products, processes 
or services. The following arguments gain especial importance:  
 Openness towards technology and science: Inglehart (1997) states that a positive climate 
for innovation is the more probable, the more open-minded and tolerant a society is, since 
openness affects private demand for new products and services. Demand is at least in part 
affected by individual attitudes (openness towards new technologies, risk attitude – see 
below) as well as by norms that shape human interaction.
14 Basically, the society’s 
openness is crucial for the innovation climate in certain regions and it also differs if 
considering certain types of technologies. Typically, differences may be identified with 
14 For some technologies, like e.g. telecommunication or the internet, network effects also gain importance. Then 
the level of individual utility increases with the number of people using the same technology.  13
respect to controversial and non-controversial technologies. While for the latter utility 
clearly dominates possible risk it is unclear in the case of controversial technologies 
whether risks or opportunities prevail.
15 As consequence these technologies are deeply 
ambivalent in the sense that strong opportunities go along with large risks.
 Individual risk attitude: Innovations are more likely to arise if the individuals are open-
minded with respect to uncertainty. To operationalize the feature ‘risk attitude’ of private 
individuals usually the results from the Eurobarometer are used.
16 It regularly monitors on 
behalf of the European Commission the public opinion. In this context, positive indicators 
for innovation are preparedness to carry risks and preferences for self employment.  
 Trust in innovation actors (science, firms, and politicians): Science and research are 
especially credible in countries having the following attributes: objective and 
differentiated commentatorship on risks and opportunities, high public acceptance of 
institutional frameworks, if people trust in and cooperate with other citizens and if 
politicians are perceived to follow rules of good governance.
Observe that a differentiated perception and assessment of opportunities and risks of new 
technologies is not per se negative for the development of new technologies. In contrast: A 
critical discussion may help develop the technology in a promising way. If doubts or 
reservation with respect to special applications are carefully considered by science, industry 
and policy and if the social and economic framework is chosen adequately it is possible to 
shape a climate that is open-minded and hence helps propagate innovation (see Hüsing 
(2002)). As will be discussed below, this aspect gains especial importance in the context of 
controversial technologies.
4 An Application to Nanotechnologies 
4.1 Nanotechnologies as General Purpose Technologies 
We now apply the argumentation detailed before on the case of nanotechnologies. They are 
perceived as being the next most important general purpose technology and with this they are 
expected to affect economic and social life significantly within the next decades. The analysis 
15 Non-controversial technologies are solar energy, new propulsion technologies or medicine. Controversial 
technologies are biotechnology, nanotechnology or high-tech agriculture (see e.g. Wertwatz et al. (2007)).  
16 Central features of the Eurobarometer include questions about health, culture, information technologies, 
environmental protection, the Euro or national defense. More information can be found at 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm.  14
begins with a brief illustration why nanotechnologies actually qualify as general purpose 
technology not only from a technological but also from an economic point of view. We then 
focus on the impact of demand thereby relying on the argumentation carried out before.  
Pervasiveness and technological dynamics: The generic function provided by 
nanotechnologies is the possibility to arrange single atoms. Nanotechnologies have huge 
potentials for improvement at the beginning of their development, are open to a multitude of 
possible uses, have an impact on nearly every part of economy and society, and can be 
embedded in already existing technologies. This causes major changes thereby affecting 
production structures, network relationships, and the social differentiation. As such, 
nanotechnologies form part of technological platforms that organize future actions, and enable 
and constrain them (see research and development; also Robinson, Rip, and Mangematin, 
2006, p. 4f.). Figure 1 demonstrates the interdependencies between several sectors, firms, 
and/or actors that utilize nanotechnologies within the production process. Looking at the 
simplest case, the hierarchical interdependencies as well as the network character are most 
suitably illustrated by a technology tree. Nanotechnologies represent the field of the general 
purpose technology. Since nanotechnologies are still at the very beginning of their 
technological development further improvement is mostly provided by universities or 
research centers. This tempers the consequences of the appropriability effect discussed above 
in the sense that basic research in the field of nanotechnologies is financed by the public.
17
Both universities and research centers frequently provide the basis for spin-offs which end up 
in the development of components that may be used as inputs in the applying sector (AS). 
Hence applying sectors reflect the downstream industries that actually or potentially make use 
of the general purpose technology or augmented products as intermediates. Note that 
remarkable effort is done to close the gap between science and application. One prominent 
way is the foundation of institutions that act as bridge between universities/research centers 
and firms.
18 Aside from vertical relationships, horizontal linkages exist between actors at the 
same level of the value chain.  
In order to depict the development and implantation logics of nanotechnologies, let us give an 
example of a possible technology tree application. Nanotechnologies have a lot of applying 
sectors, such as, the chemical industry (AS 1), microelectronics (AS 2) or pharmacy (AS 3). 
New materials could be demanded by further downstream sectors such as aviation industries 
17 A detailed discussion about financing details in the context of basic research and applied research can be found 
in Klodt (1995).  
18 Examples for such institutions are CAN in Hamburg/Germany or MINATEC in Grenoble/France.  15
(AS 11, which use fire-resistant materials for inboard equipment), or automobile industries 
(AS 12, which use scratch-resistant lacquers).
Innovational complementarities: Additionally, ICT industries make use of nano components 
to augment the calculating capacity of computers. Again, these are used by information 
technologies which have contributed significantly to the emergence of nanotechnologies. All 
illustrations of nano-scale effects and structures are based on digitally-constructed pictures. 
For more than thirty years, the capacity of computers has doubled every 12 to 18 months 
(Moore’s law). However, within the next several years, physical boundaries will put an end to 
this development because, at nano-scales, the technological characteristics of solid state 
physics cease to hold and the usual transistor will be unusable. At this point, quantum physics 
will become relevant and molecules - manipulated by nanotechnologies - could replace the 
transistors known today. Consequently, technological progress in nanotechnologies becomes a 
precondition for future innovations in microtechnology, which anew spurs technological 
progress in the nanotechnologies sector.
Reorganisation of work-life processes: Above, general purpose technologies induce major 
changes in production processes and work-life organization. Applied to nanotechnologies, this 
argument is still diffuse because today these technologies are still at the very beginning of 
their development. But just to get a vague idea, one could imagine how, for example, 
functional materials that measure functions of the human body and transmit the results 
directly to the medicine could enable people suffering from chronic illnesses to live their daily 
lives much less dependent on regular health checks or hospital visits. 
These examples show quite plainly what one can easily observe within the field of 
nanotechnologies: the concrete and possible interactions within the technology tree require a 
lot of coordination, and consequently failures may arise. 
4.2 Demand for Nanotechnologies by Applying Sectors and Consumers and aggregate 
effects 
Although nanotechnologies are used at the very beginning of the value creation chain, at the 
end it is demand for final products that drives demand for nano-intermediates. To facilitate the 
discussion we separate the two most important factors influencing demand, namely the price 
and the quality of the general purpose technology, on the one hand, and the utility derived by 
consuming a product that has been enhanced by nanotechnologies or that includes nano-
intermediates, on the other hand.  16
Firm demand: As argued before innovations are too little and they arrive too late as 
consequence of the prevailing externalities. Possibilities for internalization are at least 
twofold: At a vertical level the enforcement of property rights gains importance. Here nano-
patents may be a solution to spur innovation activities of firms along the entire value creation 
chain. On the other hand, horizontal externalities could be internalized by coordination of 
firm’s demand that act at the same level of the value creation chain, e.g. firms in the aviation 
and the dockyards sectors could use the same scratch-resistant surfaces. Platforms for demand 
coordination could basically be provided by regional institutions.
19 If successful, demand in 
downstream sectors increases thereby allowing for making use of economies of scale in the 
field of the upstream nanotechnology.  
Private demand: Like biotechnology also nanotechnologies are controversial technologies.
Hence it is not per se clear whether, from an individual point of view, chances or risks prevail. 
The individual’s attitude towards technology therefore is central. Werwatz et al. (2006, 2007) 
provide a ranking of attitudes and technology acceptances of citizens over 17 countries that 
could be used as a country’s indicator for having the potential to become a lead market in a 
certain technology field.
20 Taking an overall look over attitudes and acceptance of all 
technologies, the following becomes obvious: Denmark, Sweden and Finland dominate the 
first three ranks except for risk attitude where Ireland, South Korea and the USA are ranked 
first. For most indicators, Austria, Ireland and Spain bring up the rear.
With respect to controversial technologies – and hence also with respect to nanotechnologies - 
the following conclusions can be drawn: Nearly 90% of the citizens in the considered 
countries assign a positive effect to non-controversial technologies whereas with respect to 
controversial technologies this rate declines to 60%. It is also possible to differentiate between 
single countries: While people in the US are optimistic with respect to both controversial and 
non-controversial technologies, citizens in the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Germany, 
Finland or UK strongly differentiate with respect to certain technology fields. Within these 
countries non-controversial technologies achieve the highest acceptance rate with Germany 
being the leader. This means that Germans are very optimistic with respect to low-risk 
technologies but this optimism clearly decreases in case of controversial technologies. This 
may hamper the development of nanotechnologies in the critical countries. On the contrary, 
19 See e.g. Ott/Papilloud (2007) for an analysis of regional institution’s impact on the development of 
nanotechnologies.  
20 The following countries are included: Sweden, Finland, Denmark, The Netherlands, USA, UK, Canada, 
Belgium, Japan, South Korea, Ireland, Spain, Germany, Switzerland, France, Italy and Austria. The indicators 
focus on questions with respect to (i) openness towards technology and sciences, (ii) basic attitudes according to 
Inglehart (1997), (iii) risk attitude, (iv) trust in innovation actors, and (v) women’s participation rate.  17
observe that this differentiated attitude may become an advantage in the long run since a 
critical discussion may provide the design of new products or even political or institutional 
frameworks that foster future innovation activities. Thus, the critical scepticism in the short 
run may provide the basis for becoming a lead market in the long run if as consequence of the 
initially detailed discussion products are created that fit the needs of a large amount of 
consumers. Hence, this disadvantage with respect to regional competitiveness may turn to a 
future advantage.
21
That attitudes towards technologies diverge across societies has also been extensively 
discussed in the context of the debate on the so-called NBIC (nano-bio-info-cogno) 
convergence:
22 NBIC-Convergence for Improving Human Performance is the name of a 
prominent agenda for converging technology research in the United States. In Canada, Bio-
Systemics Synthesis suggests another agenda for converging technology research, whereas 
Converging Technologies for the European Knowledge Society (CTEKS) designates the 
European approach. It prioritizes the setting of a particular goal for converging technology 
research. This presents challenges and opportunities for research and governance alike, 
allowing for an integration of technological potential, recognition of limits, European needs, 
economic opportunities, and scientific interests. 
Long-run effects of nanotechnologies: Nanotechnologies are expected to introduce the next 
long-run wave thereby providing continuous incentives for incremental innovation. As 
discussed before it is inherent to general purpose technologies that their impact on overall 
productivity only becomes significant after sufficient complements are in the market and after 
the completion of important adjustment processes. Hence, although the recent market 
potentials of nanotechnologies are already immense it will probably take several years or even 
decades until overall productivity has increased as consequence of the use of the new general 
purpose technology. 
21 Observe that more knowledge and scientific understanding does not generally lead to higher acceptance of 
technologies and innovation. While knowledge increases acceptance of non-controversial technology this result 
does not hold for controversial technologies. Evans/Durant (1995) show that more knowledge raises the 
acceptance gap between different technology fields. Hence increasing knowledge does not automatically spur 
acceptance rates of controversial technologies. 
22 See Nordmann (2004, p. 19), and also Roco and Bainbridge (2002, p. 282). Defending a strict technological 
classification of the expression converging technology, Roco and Bainbridge (2002, p. 282) refer it to the 
combination of four major NBIC proveniences of science and technology, namely, (1) nanoscience and 
nanotechnology; (2) biotechnology and biomedicine, including genetic engineering; (3) information technology, 
including advanced computing and communications; and (4) cognitive science, including cognitive 
neuroscience. For a broader application of this expression, compare the description given by Wood, Jones, and 
Geldart (2003): “Many of the applications arising from nanotechnology may be the result of the convergence of 
several technologies” (p. 23). 18
5 Summary and conclusions 
This paper investigates the implications of innovation processes in the context of 
nanotechnologies. As drastic innovation nanotechnologies induce innovation processes in 
downstream sectors which – as consequence of feedback effects – on their hand affect 
productivity and with this innovation in the upstream nanotechnologies. The analysis is 
carried out with special attention to demand side arguments. Since nanotechnologies are 
utilized at the very beginning of the value creation chain it is necessary to disentangle 
different parts of total demand into firm’s demand for nano-components and private demand 
for final products. With respect to the firm’s demand the following gains importance: 
Innovation processes are interrelated along the value creation chain and feedback mechanisms 
work in both directions: upstream and downstream. Due to the appropriability effect 
innovating firms are not able to appropriate all benefits that are induced by their innovation 
activities. As consequence innovation arises too late and their extent is too low. On the other 
hand, nanotechnologies are highly controversial among consumers and it is not per se clear 
whether opportunities or risks in the use of final products that are augmented by 
nanotechnologies dominate. This again may hamper innovations in the fields of 
nanotechnologies and the individual’s attitude towards risk and technology becomes 
especially important. Both individual and firm’s demand hence may be suboptimally low with 
respect to a harmonized innovation process. However, interventions in the innovation process 
carefully have to consider at which level of the value chain they are realized. 
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